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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
court applied in retreating from the "informal and summary"'" pro-
ceedings provision of the act. In the alternative the board's present
exemption from important provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act"8 should be examined." Until this reevaluation is accomplished
the practitioner will need to introduce testimony, in workmen's com-
pensation proceedings, within the narrow confines of a legalistic frame-
work as opposed to the informal framework desired by the legislature.8 "
ROBERT DEBRUYN
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Real Estate Broker Held Liable in Damages for Unauthorized
Practice of Law. In Washington the problem' presented by individuals
engaging in an unauthorized practice of law' traditionally has been
dealt with by utilizing one of three alternative forms of redress. Those
forms are: prosecution for a misdemeanor; bringing an equitable
action to enjoin such conduct; and the exercise of the inherent power
of the court to punish such conduct as contempt.8 The recent case of
Mattieligh v. Poe4 has added a new weapon to the arsenal which can
32 RCW 51.52.115.8
'RCW 34.04.
84 RCW 34.04.150: "The provisions of RCW 34.04.090 through 34.04.130 shall not
apply to the board of industrial insurance appeals...." RCW 34.04.100 provides in
part: "Agencies or their authorized agents, may admit and give probative effect to
evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the coduct of their affairs."
35 See generally, Wollett, The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals after Nine
Years: A Partial Evaluation, 33 WASH. L. REv. 80 (1958).
1 Although the specific reasons for classifying it a problem may vary with individual
writers the general theme is that such unauthorized practice increases the possibility
of harm resulting to the public. "Persons who are not licensed to practice law are
usually incompetent to practice. Incompetent practice often causes harm to the public.
Therefore, practice by unlicensed persons may often cause harm to the public, and
should be prevented." Offenbacker, Unauthorized Practice in Washington, 30 WASH.
L. REv. 249, 250 (1955). A slightly different approach has been taken on the basis of
the Canons of Professional Ethics. "It would be useless to establish high standards of
morality for members of the profession if those who are not members, and therefore
not bound by such canons, could practice the arts of the profession." Adler, Unauthor-
ized Practice: A Continuing Campaign in the Public Interest, 44 A.B.A.J. 649 (1958).
Another strong motivation on the part of the Bar to eliminate the unauthorized prac-
titioner is seldom discussed, that is the threat that such unauthorized practice presents
to the monetary interests of the authorized practitioners.
2 It is beyond the scope of this Casenote to adequately define those actions which
constitute an unauthorized practice of law in Washington. For additional information
as to that aspect see, Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors,
41 Wn.2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952), and Offenbacker, Unauthorized Practice in Wash-
ington, 30 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1955). There are several law review articles relating
to the attempts by other jurisdictions to define unauthorized practice, but in the
Washington State Bar Ass'n case the Washington Supreme Court specifically refused
to cite other jurisdictions for their definitions of unauthorized practice because of the
great diversity in their respective definitions.
8 These three forms of redress are referred to in RCW 2.48.180 and in In re McCal-
lum, 186 Wash. 312, 315-16, 57 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1936).
4 157 Wash. Dec. 95, 356 P.2d 328 (1960).
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be invoked to discourage the unauthorized practice of law. The Su-
preme Court of Washington indicated that the unauthorized practi-
tioner may be liable for damages for all injuries resulting by virtue of
his unlawful practice. Mattieligk also indicates that the unauthorized
practitioner may be held to a higher standard of care than the au-
thorized practitioner.
The Mattielig case was an appeal from the trial court's dismissal
of the plaintiff's action to recover a commission which had been paid
to the defendant, a licensed real estate broker. The plaintiff was an
old, foreign-born farmer with a limited ability to read, write or speak
the English language.5 After the defendant's suggestion the plaintiff
became interested in selling his 55 acre farm which was located near
Kenmore. The defendant secured a purchaser for the land and later
drafted the final contract of sale for the parties. The drafting of this
contract was viewed by the supreme court as constituting an unauthor-
ized practice of law.
After the final contract of sale was signed by both of the parties,
the purchaser began sending the plaintiff checks of $150 as his monthly
payments in compliance with the provisions of the contract. Although
the plaintiff received these checks for a period of eight months, he
alleged that none of them had been cashed. By the end of the eight
month period, the plaintiff discovered that the provisions of the con-
tract did not conform with the instructions he had given the defendant
broker. The plaintiff's delay in making that discovery may be ex-
plained by two factors; first, the plaintiff's allegation that the de-
fendant had retained possession of the contract even after it had been
signed by the parties; and second, the nature of the variations made
in the drafting of the contract. The principal variations were in refer-
ence to the amount due as monthly payments and the conditions under
which subdivisions of the farm would be deeded over to the purchaser
in advance of the complete payment of the total purchase price. The
contract as drafted by the defendant provided for payments of $150
or more per month, but the planitiff had informed the defendant that
he desired monthly payments sufficient to retire the principal amount
owing on the contract at the rate of $150 per month. Under the terms
of the contract no interest was to accrue until the plaintiff evacuated
the premises, and subsequently when he did evacuate, approximately
S The allegation in the appellant!s brief that he possessed a very limited ability in
regards to the English language was accepted by the majority of the court. Judge Ott
vigorously disputed the validity of the appellant's allegation in a dissenting opinion.
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six months after the signing of the contract, the monthly payments
provided for in the contract became inadequate.6
After the plaintiff discovered that the contract did not conform to
the instructions that he had given, he sued for a modification of the
contract to conform with the terms to which he had agreed. The result
was an agreed rescission of the sale contract. The plaintiff then insti-
tuted the present action to recover the $1250 commission which the
broker had retained from the original down payment on the contract
of sale. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on
the ground that the evidence produced by the plaintiff was not sufficient
to sustain his cause of action.
The supreme court by a six to three dicision reversed the trial court
and remanded the controversy for trial. Judge Foster in writing the
majority opinion stated: "When a broker undertakes to practice law,
he is liable for negligence. It is immaterial whether the broker's
attempt to prepare a contract, such as had been authorized by his
client, failed because of ignorance, stupidity, incompetence, negligence
or fraud."7 This being the first time that the Washington court has
expressed itself as to potential liability for an unauthorized practice
of law, there were no appropriate Washington precedents which could
be cited in support of the court's position. The prior cases dealing with
the unauthorized practice of law in Washington have been handled in
the traditional pattern. Consequently, the court relied upon authorities
from outside the Washington jurisdiction. Those authorities were: a
California case,8 an Oklahoma case,' and a Casenote in Vanderbilt
Law Review.1" The California case, Biakanja v. Irving," is the most
important because the decision of the lower court provided the basis
of the Oklahoma decision and the Vanderbilt Casenote.
The Biakanja case involved a suit against a notary public who had
drafted a will which was held to be invalid due to a lack of sufficient
attestation. The devisee under the invalid will brought an action
against the notary to recover, as damages, the difference between that
6 The total sale price of the land in this transaction was $39,500 of which $3,000 was
paid as a down-payment. The contract provided for interest at 5% per annum, there-
fore, initially the interest accruing on the contract would amount to approximately
$150 per month. Hence, under the contract as it was drafted by the defendant, the
plaintiff would only be getting approximately half as much per month as had been
contemplated by the sale, and the payments made by the purchaser would never sub-
stantially reduce the principal debt.
7 Mattieligh v. Poe, 157 Wash. Dec. 95, 96, 356 P.2d 328, 329 (1960).
8 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. App.2d 647, 420 P.2d 16 (1958).
9 Latson v. Eaton, 341 P.2d 247 (Okla. 1959).
10 Note, 11 VAND. L. REv. 599 (1958).
1 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. App. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) ; Biakanja v. Irving,
310 P.2d 63 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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which he should have received had the will been valid and that which
he actually did receive from the estate. The California District Court
of Appeals, in the Biakanjai " case, held the notary liable for damages
by imposing strict liability for engaging in an unauthorized practice of
law. California and Washington have similar statutes relating to the
practice of law.'" They provide that only active members of the state
bar can practice law within the state. The court held that the plaintiff
was within the class which the statute was designed to protect, so the
notary's violation of the statute made him liable for damages. This
decision formed the basis for the Vanderbilt Casenote, which states:
Persons who practice law without authority or engage in acts that may
be construed as such practice, should take warning from this case, for
they are acting at their peril. Absolute liability is placed on the un-
authorized practitioner for any mistake that may be incorporated in
his work, for no matter how deeply concealed the defect may lie his
failure to draw an instrument validly, to the injury of anyone, is negli-
gence per se. This seems to be a policy decision designed to enforce
the prohibition of the statute rather than to penalize for careless con-
duct.1
The preceding quotation, with the exception of the last sentence, was
cited by the majority opinion of the Mattielig case in a footnote' 5
When the Biakanja case was appealed to the California Supreme
Court the opinion of the district court was vacated but the liability
imposed upon the notary was upheld. The decision of the supreme
court was based upon a finding that the notary negligently drafted the
will, rather than a finding that the violation of the statute was negli-
gence per se. In order to impose liability on the basis of negligence
the court had to overrule a former decision which had required privity
as a prerequisite to recovery in a tort action.'6 The supreme court
decision in the Biakanja case-has been commented upon in several law
reviews,' 7 one of which states as follows:
The court's approach also seems preferable to the rigid doctrine of
negligence per se based upon statutory violation as applied by the
district court of appeals. Although the concept of negligence per se
based upon statutory violation is a proper analysis when the statute
'
2 Biakanja v. Irving, 310 P.2d 63 (Calif. Dist Ct App. 1957).
"3RCW 2.48.170; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 6125.
"4 Note, 11 VAwD. L. Rav. 599, 602 (1958).
1'5 Mattieligh v. Poe, 157 Wash. Dec. 95, 97, 356 P2d 328, 329 (1960).
16 For a discussion jof the privity aspect of this case see; Note, 7 KAw. L. Ray. 83
(1958).
"7E.g. Note, 33 CALIF. S.BJ. 297 (1958); Note, 72 HARv. L. Ray. 380 (1958);
Note, 7 KAw. L. Ray. 83 (1958).
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can be interpreted as prescribing a standard of care, violation of licens-
ing statutes, as in the present case, does not necessarily signify failure
to exercise due care.... The position of the lower court presented the
anomaly that the unauthorized practitioner was held to a stricter lia-
bility than that imposed on one who had passed the licensing require-
ments, although such liability may be justified as an additional deter-
rent to the illegal conduct."' (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion in the Mattieligh case also cited the Oklahoma
case of Latson v. Eaton." There damages were awarded because the
defendant, who was not licensed to practice law in the state, improperly
prepared certain legal documents. Oklahoma also has an unauthorized
practice of law statute similar to the one in Washington.2 The Okla-
homa court, in imposing liability, cited the district court decision in
the Biakanja2" case, which imposed liability because of the statutory
violation. The court then proceeded to justify its decision in terms of
public policy, i.e. that the public should be protected from the injuries
which would probably result if unskilled and untrained persons were
permitted to practice law.
The Washington Supreme Court did not firmly commit itself to the
negligence per se doctrine with respect to the unauthorized practice of
law. But in light of the language used and the authorities cited, there
is an indication in any event that those violating the statute will be
held to a very high standard of care. The ambiguity of the court's
position is evidenced by the following quote: "When a broker under-
takes to practice law, he is liable for negligence. It is immaterial
whether the broker's attempt to prepare a contract, such as had been
authorized by his client, failed because of his ignorance, stupidity,
incompetence, negligence or fraud."2 2 While the first sentence pro-
claims that the unauthorized practitioner shall be liable for negligence,
the second sentence states that the finding of negligence is immaterial
to the imposition of liability. Thus the court has apparently stopped
just short of declaring that the violation of the practice of law statute
is negligence per se.
Because the court has not attempted to formulate a comprehensive
definition of unauthorized practice,2" those individuals engaged in
'1 Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 380, 382 (1958).
39 Latson v. Eaton, 341 P.2d 247 (Okla. 1959).
20 OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1 app., art. 3 (2) (1951).
21 Biakanja v. Irving, 310 P.2d 63 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
22 Mattieligh v. Poe, 157 Wash. Dec. 95, 96, 356 P.2d 328, 329 (1960).
23 Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wn.2d 697,
701, 251 P.2d 619, 622 (1952) : "We need not decide what activities are or are not




practices within the gray area are in a particularly precarious position
with respect to potential liability. The term gray area refers to those
activities which are difficult to classify as either constituting or not
constituting a practice of law. The preparation of business documents
has been, and still is, the most difficult of the activities to classify."4 It
has been stated "that the preparation of any document having any
effect upon the legal relations of the parties, concerning a transaction
to which the draftsman is not a party, amounts to practice of law. 2 5
This concept was broadly applied in Paul v. Stanley,"8 where the Wash-
ington court's decree enumerated an impressive list of documents as
being within the scope of the prohibition from:
[P] reparing or drawing for others, for reward, present or prospective,
deeds, mortgages, leases, agreements, contracts, bills of sale, chattel
mortgages, wills, notes, conditional sales contracts, relating to either
real or personal property, options, powers of attorney, community
property agreements, liens, bonds, mortgage assignments, mortgage
releases, chattel mortgage satisfactions, creditors' claims in probate,
notice to vacate premises, notice to quit or pay rent, vendors statements
of creditors under the bulk sales law, articles of incorporation, and any
other documents requiring the use of knowledge of law in their prep-
aration.27 (Emphasis added.)
In this opinion the court also rejected the simple-complex instruments
rule." This rejection was made for the reason expressed by Judge
Pound in a New York decision: "I am unable to rest any satisfactory
test on the distinction between simple and complex instruments. The
most complex are simple to the skilled and the simplest often trouble
the inexperienced." 29 The rejection of this rule has been so complete
in Washington that the mere filling in of blanks on a printed form has
been held to constitute the practice of law."
24 Offenbacker, Unauthorized Practice in Washington, 30 WAsH. L. REv. 249,
251-52 (1955). The phases of legal practice fall conveniently into four categories;(1) the management of a cause before a court, (2) preparation of pleadings and
similar documents to be used in a legal proceeding (these first two are so obvious
that there is no real problem of unauthorized practice), (3) the giving of legal advice,
and (4) the preparation of ordinary business instruments.2 Offenbacker, supra note 24 at 253.
28168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
27 Id. at 374, 12 P.2d at 402. See also, Comment, Injunctive Relief Against the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 8 WAsH. L. REv. 33 (1933).
28 The simple-complex instruments rule relates to a classification of the instrument;
if it is found to be simple then the drafting of it does not constitute a practice of law.
29People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666, 670 (1919).
20 Comment, Injunctive Relief Against the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 8 WAsH.
L. Ray. 33, 36 (1933).
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In Paul v. Stanley81 the court held that it was necessary to find
compensation involved before an activity could be classified as consti-
tuting an unauthorized practice of law. But that holding was specifi-
cally overruled by Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of
Realtors.2 While dispensing with the requirement of compensation,
the court was more restrictive in the scope of its injunctive decree than
the court had been in the Stanley case. The implication is that in the
absence of compensation the definition of what constitutes legal prac-
tice may be more restrictive in nature than it is when compensation
is involved.
Prior to the Mattieligh case the vague definition of unauthorized
practice did not present any serious problems because the courts
utilized injunctive relief as the means of controlling such practices.
Thus the court actions usually sought only to prevent a specific un-
authorized practitioner from performing specific activities in the
future. Such relief did not impose a liability or punishment for those
practices which had occurred prior to the issuance of the decree. But
the Washington Supreme Court, in the Mattieligh case, has imposed
an additional sanction upon the unauthorized practitioner of law; lia-
bility for damages resulting from such activity. Hence, there is now
a greater need for the court to declare a flexible standard as to what
activities may constitute an unauthorized practice of law. A standard
is needed in order that business men, and others performing activities
within the gray area, can operate efficiently and yet avoid the conse-
quences of having committed an unauthorized practice.
The classification of an activity as being an unauthorized practice of
law brings it within the scope of the Mattieligh case but it does not
necessarily answer the ultimate question of liability. In the Mattieligh
decision the court has not clearly adopted the negligence per se doc-
trine in regards to damages resulting from an unauthorized practice of
law. But it has sufficiently approached that position so that it is pos-
sible to state that the unauthorized practitioner will be held to a
higher standard of care than the licensed practitioner. A person who is
not a member of the state bar association and who gives legal advice or
engages in a legal activity may find himself liable for any injury result-
ing from those services, even though they were rendered gratuitously.
EDwARD B. MAcKIE
31168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932). The court found the requirement of compen-
sation in RRS § 139-4 (which is now RCW 2.48.190).
32 41 Wn.2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952).
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